Michal Onderco is a political scientist at the Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Sciences who specialises in diplomatic affairs, geopolitics and international relations, particularly in the field of nuclear non-proliferation.
European countries currently don’t have a sufficient army to defend themselves. How did we get here?
“There used to be a running joke which said that European armies were dignified pension funds. Most military spending didn’t go to new equipment, but to personnel and pensions – not exactly the core business of an army. For many European countries, NATO membership formed the basis of their defence policy. Since the 1990s, European countries have been living this, let’s call it a geopolitical dream. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Europe saw little external threat, viewing wars as bad things that happen to other people. When we dealt with war, it was about what scholars call ‘wars of choice’; like Afghanistan or Iraq.
“However, this mindset shifted after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and the takeover of Crimea, and was further reinforced during Trump’s first term, when he threatened to withdraw U.S. security guarantees. This led to increased defence spending in Europe, though uncertainty remained about how to best allocate the funds.”
Did this underspending apply to all European countries?
“Generally, yes, but there are a few exceptions. Poland has never taken a geopolitical vacation, after having been divided by foreign powers in previous wars. Finland has a 1300-kilometre-long border with Russia. It fought a war with Russia eighty years ago, when it lost 10 per cent of its territory. So they know they need to be prepared.”
And then Russia invaded Ukraine.
“Yes, after 2022 everyone realised that war is really happening on European ground. This is when all the European countries started to reinvest in defence and security. The Netherlands for instance sold off its main battle tanks ten years ago, and last year they announced that they want to purchase some again.”
Is there political consensus that increasing spending on defence is necessary?
“Yes, no major political parties oppose increased defence spending, except for a few far-left ones. This is remarkable, as centre-left parties in Europe have traditionally favoured the welfare state over defence spending, a trend dating back to the 1970s. That was the case, even during the Cold War. But it’s not what we see in present-day politics.”
Doesn’t more spending on defence policy just lead to an arms race, like we saw in the Cold War?
“Yes, I partially agree that it could lead to a vicious circle. However, to be able to step out of this circle, you need a counterpart with whom you can work. And I’m not sure whether with Putin, we have a counterpart to work with.
“During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s leaders realised they needed to spend so much money on defence that they didn’t have money left for anything else. That became a problem. So, they selected someone who was more open to having a constructive relationship with the West. Once there was a man with whom the West could make deals, we could step out from the vicious circle of armament. With Putin, I don’t think we can do that at this moment.”
Is the lack of a reasonable counterparty an issue only with Russia?
“For Europeans, the primary concern is Russia. However, for Americans, it’s a dual challenge, as they focus on both Russia and China. The U.S. sees its future well-being increasingly at stake in the Asia-Pacific region and is deeply concerned about competition with China.”
Do you mean economic competition, or in terms of security?
“These two are heavily intertwined. The U.S. economy has relied heavily on cooperation with countries like Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia, with Taiwan being critical as the world’s leading chip manufacturer. Since China views Taiwan as part of its territory, a Chinese occupation of Taiwan would disrupt global chip supplies. Also, the U.S. made security commitments to Taiwan. So Chinese involvement would potentially escalate into a shooting war with the U.S.
“U.S. foreign and economic policy, regardless of whether Democrats or Republicans were in power, had two holy grails that nobody messed with: maintaining key alliances with NATO, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; and a liberal trade policy, meaning not imposing tariffs. Tariffs are economically speaking very backwards. They raise prices and ultimately harm domestic consumers.
“However, Trump announced he wants to put import tariffs on Taiwanese chips. And earlier he announced some other, let’s say politically unconventional ideas, like taking over Greenland, and taking over the Panama Canal. Trump’s approach to foreign economic policy and defence remains massively uncertain.”
How does Trump’s re-election and the uncertainty he brings, impact Europe’s defence policy?
“After Trump’s re-election, there were three main perspectives on how this would affect Europe. The first argued that Trump’s first term saw an increase in U.S. troops and commitment to developing military capabilities in Europe, so things would be fine. The second believed that if Europe increases defence spending and buys American equipment, Trump will be pleased, and things will blow over. The third view was that this will be challenging, and it will be problematic if Russia were to invade a country in the Baltic. Europeans would have to do a lot of more of the heavy lifting, and we are better to be prepared for that.
“But nobody was prepared for the idea that the US president would come to power and proclaim that he wanted to take a part of a European country. There hasn’t been a response from the EU, nor NATO. The Danes are in a crisis mode. They are now making diplomatic rounds to try to find out where other European countries stand on this.
“Additionally, Trump stated that the EU should stop fighting American companies for their violations of the privacy law GDPR. And that Europe should buy more American oil, even though we already buy a lot more American oil than ever before in the past. All of these things taken together bring us to a world which a year ago, even a month ago, was unthinkable.”
“Policymakers need to think about how to respond to this. We cannot just tell Trump to get lost, because we still depend on the US for our own security in a lot of extremely crucial ways.”
Like what?
“Very basic things, like strategic airlift capabilities; large aircraft needed to transport military supplies. We don’t have it because we never had the need to develop them.
“Another example: let’s say we were in a conflict with Russia in the Baltics. Rotterdam’s port would be a key supply point and a likely missile target. To detect this, we need early warning systems, but currently, we rely for this monitoring on the U.S. satellites.
Is this situation worse than it was during the Cold War?
“During the Cold War there was the East-West division. The respective armies on the ground were stationed very close to each other; just a few hundred kilometres from, for instance, Fulda in Germany. The Soviets had plans to invade. The risk and the tension were higher than they are now. For countries such as the Netherlands, at least.
“However, the situation today is more complex, because not only do we have this lack of reasonable counterpart, also our main security guarantor and supposed ally we cannot trust 100 per cent. During the Cold War there were 200,000 American soldiers in Central Europe. So we knew that there was a certain guarantee. That’s simply not the case anymore.”
Do European politicians know how to spend their increased defence funding?
“There are three key developments. First, defence budgets are rising, with countries now considering spending 3 to 3.5 per cent of their GDP. Second, new military capabilities, such as missiles, tanks, aircraft, and armoured vehicles, are being acquired. Third, there’s a growing emphasis on developing these capabilities within Europe, with increased cooperation both within Europe and with non-European allies like South Korea and Israel. The big question now is whether to also collaborate on defence with the U.S.”
How do you see the future? Where do you think we will go from here?
“There is so much uncertainty right now that I think if you went to The Hague and talked to people at the Ministry of Defence, they would be puzzled as well. So time will tell, and I suspect time will tell sooner rather than later.”
That sounds ominous …
“I think we will soon get more clarity about where Trump really stands. Where does he stand with NATO, and with Greenland? Is he actually going to go ahead and annex the Panama Canal? What will he do about the war in Ukraine? My feeling is that by this summer 2025 we’ll have much more clarity on these issues.”
